Wild Card Weekend Roundup

Welcome back to my blog, Touchdowns and Kicks. Here is my rundown from the 4 games just completed in the NFL Wild Card Round.

Seattle 35 Washington 14

Mike Holmgren has blown 4th quarter leads in a playoff game six times

1995 vs Dallas: led 27-24, lost 38-27
1998 vs San Francisco: led 27-23, lost 30-27
1999 vs Miami: led 17-13, lost 20-17
2003 vs Green Bay: led 20-13, lost 33-30 in overtime
2004 vs Saint Louis: led 20-17, lost 27-20
2006 vs Chicago: led 24-21, lost 27-24 in overtime

As for Joe Gibbs, his Washington Redskins have never blown a 4th quarter in a playoff game.

So which coach would find a way to lose the game, based on history? Holmgren, of course.

Well, history took a back seat on Saturday. It was the Skins and Joe Gibbs who found a way to snatch defeat from the hands of victory at the most crucial time.

BIG PLAY (S) OF THE GAME

I don’t think the biggest play of the game was the missed 30 yard field goal that would have made the score 17-13 with 11:37 remaining in the 4th quarter. Not at all.

If the kick was good the Seahawks would have been trailing by 4 points instead of 1 point, still a one possession game, with plenty of time on the clock.

And do not forget the result of the missed field goal: Matt Hasselback was intercepted on the following drive. So no points were lost as a result, and it was still a one possession game regardless.

No I think the biggest plays were the three plays following the kick recovery, not the missed field goal that resulted.

Rewind: The Skins had just scored to take the lead 14-13. The Seahawks mess up the kickoff and the Skins had the ball on the 9 yard line.

Now, keep in mind that a Skins touchdown would have made the score 21-13, keeping the game within one possession.

Whatever the strategy was, the Skins needed a touchdown to really put the screws into the Seahawks. They didn’t get it. And that was the game.

Jacksonville 31 Pittsburgh 29

The biggest play of the game was the same for both teams, but for different reasons.

4th and 2 from the Steeler 43 yard line, 1:56 remaining, Steelers lead 29-28. Steelers have all three timeouts, Jags have none. If the Jags don’t get a first down, GAME OVER.

Result: David Garrard quarterback draw all the way to the 11 yard line, keeping the Jags final drive alive.

Okay, the Jags are now well within field goal range: that was their biggest play. The whistle stops the play at 1:48, play clock rest to 40.

Garrard’s scramble was also the Steelers’ biggest play, but for opposite reasons of course: Clock management.

1:47, 1:46, 1:45, 1:44, the clock kept ticking. 1:43, 1:42 and ticking...

Why didn’t coach Mike Tomlin call a timeout? It was the simplest decision he could make.

The Steelers had all three timeouts left.

The Jags had none and they were already in field goal range. You can bet your last dollar that they were not going to hurry to the line of scrimmage to run a play until all 40 seconds on the play clock expired.

Tomlin’s strategy at this point was simple: call your first timeout immediately, stopping the clock with 1:48 left. Using the theory that Jacksonville would run the ball three times (with two more clock stoppages to come) Tomlin could expect his offense to get back on the field with about 40-45 seconds remaining and no timeouts.

A great situation for Pittsburgh? Not really. But 45 seconds is much better than 30 seconds.

1:41, 1:40, 1:39...still not timeout called.

Now, after wasting a full 10 seconds on the clock, the Steelers should have used their timeouts after the next snap. No use calling a timeout after you’ve already lost 10 seconds. That ship had sailed.

So Mike Tomlin made a mistake by not calling his first timeout at 1:48. He’d have to use them on the next three snaps. He’d still get the ball back with about 40-45 seconds remaining.

And then it happened. The Steelers called timeout with 1:36 remaining. TWELVE SECONDS LATE.

Why? After twelve seconds elapsed, the decision was made for you: wait until the next snap to call your timeouts. The Jags are going to run the ball anyways, forcing you to stop the clock.

What did calling the timeout with 1:36 remaining do? It completely changed the complexion of the Steelers final drive. By waiting to call a timeout after the first down snap Big Ben would have had 40-45 seconds left to move the ball down the field for a game winning field goal attempt, now Big Ben would be left with, at most 30 seconds to move the ball.

End result: Steelers got the ball back with 29 seconds left on their own 28 yard line. No timeouts. Ben sacked on first play, fumble, Jag recovery. Game over.

Another question: why did Mike Tomlin decide to go for 2 after the Steelers cut the lead to 28-23 early in the 4th quarter? Still too early I thought and if they failed and the Jags kicked a field goal later on, the spread would have been 8, and there was plenty of time on the clock.

The decision to go for 2 was wrong I thought, but it didn’t matter. On the 2 point play (which worked) the Steelers were flagged for holding, putting the ball back to the 12 yard line. At this point, the Steelers should have kicked the extra point.

Why go for 2 from the 12 yard line on what is essentially a 4th and goal play? Well they did, play failed and as a result they ended up going for 2 when they scored a touchdown on their next drive to compensate. Failed again, opening the door for one Jag drive which needed a field goal to win, not tie.

Had the Steelers kicked extra points on their two 4th quarter touchdowns, the Jags would have trailed by 3 instead of one.

Chargers 17 Titans 6

The game turned when Rob Bironas missed a 38 yard field goal that would have made the score 10-9 with just over 14 minutes left in the 4th quarter.

If the score was 10-9 then the Titans would have been guaranteed a chance to tie the game on their next drive at the very least, even if the Chargers went down the field to score a touchdown, which is what happened: subsequent Charger drive went 72 yards in 12 plays for a 17-6 lead.

At this point the game was over because there was no way the Titans were going to go down the field twice with 8:45 remaining. Why? Vince Young’s passing stats. Young threw 29 passes for 138 yards and was sacked three times for nine yards.

Yards per pass play, as I have written on many occasions, is a telling statistic because it indicates how quickly a team can go down the field. The Titans passing offense versus the Chargers: 32 dropbacks for 129 yards, an average of 4.03 yards per pass play.

Giants 24 Bucs 14

Notice that Eli Manning and Philip Rivers won playoff games on the same day. They were traded for each other on Draft Day 2004.

Not much else to say about this game. I fell asleep and woke up just in time for the Titans Chargers clash.

I'll be back Friday with my look at the Divisional Round.

Jimmy G